Decades of warnings, innovations, and proven alternatives have been ignored long enough; Filipino farmers and scientists have already shown the way out of fossil fuel-dependent agriculture yet the government still lags behind.
As early as 1966, Filipino scientists were already advancing alternatives to fossil fuel dependent agriculture. Long before โsustainabilityโ became a global buzzword, they identified viable, locally adaptable solutions such as the nitrogen-fixing Azolla-Anabaena system; composting enhanced by Tricoderma; and microbial inoculants such as Rhizobium and Mycorrhiza. For pest management, they recommended biological controls by harnessing natural enemies and diversified farming systems, or polyculture, integrating crops, livestock, and aquaculture (1). Grounded in scientific rigor and attuned to the ecological and economic realities of Filipino farmers, we can only guess that scientists at that time were cautious in anticipating the vulnerabilities of an agricultural system tethered to fossil fuels. Yet by the end of the 1960s, a different path was being institutionalized.
Domestic production of synthetic fertilizers had already plateaued, even as demand surged with the rapid expansion of Masagana 99, a program built on high-yielding varieties dependent on heavy fossil-fuel based fertilizers (2). Instead of strengthening local capacity or investing in the already available biological alternatives, the government turned outward, importing increasing volumes of synthetic fertilizers to sustain the programโa decision that would soon collide with global history.
๐ง๐ต๐ฒ ๐ญ๐ต๐ณ๐ฏ ๐๐น๐ผ๐ฏ๐ฎ๐น ๐ข๐ถ๐น ๐๐ฟ๐ถ๐๐ถ๐
In 1967, the Six-Day War between Arab states and Israel erupted- an event that would set in motion geopolitical tensions culminating in the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the subsequent oil embargo. The result was what has been called the worldโs first true energy crisis (3).
The Philippines, already structurally dependent on imported inputs, was severely exposed. Roughly 8,800 kilometers from Israel, the country’s oil bill instantly surged from USD 200 million to USD 700 million (4). At the same time, global prices of synthetic fertilizers which are closely tied to fossil fuel costs quadrupled. By then, the Philippines was importing as much as 97% of its urea supply (5). For farmers, the consequences were devastating. The cost of cultivating one hectare of rice increased by 51%, while net farm incomes declined by as much as 52% between 1970 and 1981 (6). What had been promoted as a pathway to agricultural modernization became, in practice, a mechanism of deepening indebtedness and dependency. Meanwhile, the alternative pathway, articulated as early as 1966 was systematically sidelined.
According to then IRRI chief statistician Dr. Burton Onate, both IRRI and the Philippine government chose to ignore, downgrade, or block research on organic and biological inputs, dismissing them as too labor-intensive. Yet even this claim was contested by both entities. Filipino scientists had already developed practical innovations, such as sporalization or the collection and distribution of azolla spores in simple plastic packs that could be broadcast across rice fields. What was dismissed as a constraint had, in fact, been addressed locally. The issue was not feasibility, but political and developmental priority as it would kill the multinational manufacture and trade of fossil-fuel based fertilizers (7).
๐ง๐ต๐ฒ ๐ฅ๐ฒ๐๐๐ฟ๐ป ๐ผ๐ณ ๐ฎ ๐๐ฎ๐บ๐ถ๐น๐ถ๐ฎ๐ฟ ๐๐ฟ๐ถ๐๐ถ๐
Half a century later, the same structural vulnerability persists. Todayโs oil crisis driven by the on-going aggression of US-Israel towards Iran coupled with speculative global markets and deregulated laws once again exposes the fragility of an agricultural system built on fossil fuel dependence. Same in 1973, the shock is transmitted almost immediately to the Philippines with fuel prices surge, transport costs rise, and most critically, the price of synthetic fertilizers that is still largely imported follows the upward spiral of global energy markets.
Farmers today confront the same dilemma faced by their predecessors during the oil crisis of the 1970s: escalating costs of production without a corresponding increase in farmgate prices. Fertilizers, pesticides, and mechanized inputs have become more expensive, compressing already thin margins. According to data, 45% of synthetic fertilizers come from the Persian Gulf whereas 15% of are directly coming from Iran. The result is a familiar cycle of indebtedness, reduced net incomes, and, in many cases, the abandonment of land or the scaling down of production. Therefore, what is often presented as a new crisis is, in fact, the continuation of an unresolved one, and this further intensified by the climate crisis.
๐๐ฎ๐ฟ๐บ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ ๐ฎ๐ป๐ฑ ๐ฆ๐ฐ๐ถ๐ฒ๐ป๐๐ถ๐๐๐ ๐ต๐ฎ๐๐ฒ ๐ฎ๐น๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฎ๐ฑ๐ ๐ฑ๐ผ๐ป๐ฒ ๐ถ๐, ๐๐ต๐ ๐ฐ๐ฎ๐ป’๐ ๐๐ต๐ฒ ๐๐ผ๐๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ป๐บ๐ฒ๐ป๐?
The knowledge to break from fossil fuel-dependent agriculture has long existed and is now embodied in what we now recognize as farmer-led agroecology. In MASIPAG farming communities, agroecology regenerates soils, restores biodiversity, lowers costs, and builds resilience to volatile inputs, drawing on farmersโ knowledge and collaboration with scientists to breed, select, and share resilient seeds and farming systems. It directly counters the vulnerabilities that every oil crisis has exposed: dependence on imported inputs, soaring costs, and fragile monocultures.
Crucially, this transformation is not only technical but also social, organizational and above most, political. The role of NGOs and social scientists has been vital in strengthening peopleโs organizations (POs), facilitating farmer-to-farmer learning, and supporting processes of collective analysis and action. Through this, communities are able to explore and consolidate collective production approaches, shared resource management, and cooperative systems that further reduce dependence on external inputs while reinforcing solidarity and local control over food systems.
๐ฆ๐ฐ๐ฎ๐น๐ฒ ๐จ๐ฝ ๐ฎ๐ป๐ฑ ๐ฆ๐ฐ๐ฎ๐น๐ฒ ๐ข๐๐
Across the Philippines, small and subsistence farmers are already charting the path forward- cutting dependence on chemical inputs, diversifying crops, rebuilding soils, and reclaiming control over seeds, with scientists supporting through participatory research. These are not fringe experiments but proven, locally grounded systems that sustain livelihoods and strengthen communities (8). More importantly, they are quietly rebuilding what decades of input-dependent agriculture have eroded: farmersโ capacity for self-reliance with their knowledge, resources, and collective strength, rather than the dictates of volatile global markets.
The question, then, is no longer whether alternatives exist. It is whether the government is willing to recognize, support, and scale what farmers themselves have already made possible. Policies must move decisively to expand agroecological farming, integrate farmersโ knowledge into decision-making, and invest in systems that genuinely enhance autonomy and resilience.
Farmers and scientists have already done it. Farmer-led Agroecology works. The government must catch up.
References:
Crisostomo. 1986. Unmasking IRRI. Midweek.
David et al. 1981. An Analysis of fertilizer policies in the Philippines. PIDS. https://pidswebs.pids.gov.ph/…/pidsjpd81-fertilizer.pdf
Sy. W. 2026. A repeat of the 1973 Oil Crisis?. Philstar. https://www.philstar.com/…/2514522/repeat-1973-oil-crisis
Samonte S. 2022. The 1973 oil crisis and PH. Glimpses and Gazes. Philippine News Agency. https://www.pna.gov.ph/…/581-the-1973-oil-crisis-and-ph
David et al. 1981. An Analysis of fertilizer policies in the Philippines. PIDS. https://pidswebs.pids.gov.ph/…/pidsjpd81-fertilizer.pdf
Modina. 1987. Miracle that never was. Aces Foundation
Crisostomo. 1986. Unmasking IRRI. Midweek.
IBON. 2025. Barriers and Pathways Scaling Agroecology to Address Climate Change: The Philippine Case. IBON Foundation. https://www.ibon.org/…/10/barriers-pathways_251017.pdf